Abstract. This paper focuses on the recruitment behaviour of ®rms at the extensive margin; we empirically explore the relationship between employer search strategies and the number of applicants by means of (reduced form) two-equations simultaneous models. The empirical analysis is carried out on a rich micro data set on Dutch employer recruitment behaviour.
Introduction
Because the match between a vacant position and a prospective employee is fraught with uncertainty, ®rms usually screen more than one applicant before tendering an employment o¨er. This is what de®ne as the extensive margin of search, as opposed to the intensive margin of search, which pertains to the collection of information about single applicants.
Little is known about the search activities of ®rms at either margin. The interaction between labour market conditions, ®rm search channel use and number of applicants has seldom been analysed. In this paper we aim to investigate two ± thus far ± unexplored issues regarding ®rms' search activities at the extensive margin: (i) how is ®rms' recruitment channel use in¯uenced by the prevailing economic conditions on the labour market; and (ii) what is the impact of ®rm recruitment channel use on the number of applicants. ®nd that employers in the US spend on average eight hours per applicant during the interview and screening process; the number of interview hours increases for positions which require greater education (and skill) levels. Furthermore, an increase in the¯ow of applicants increases the number of interviewed applicants (before tendering a job o¨er), but it simultaneously reduces the hours spent per interview. Employers apparently exchange extensive search (the number of applicants) for intensive search (amount of information per applicant). The robustness of these results is stressed in Barron et al. (1997) , where four di¨erent surveys (regarding the U.S.) are empirically analysed and contrasted with empirical results referring to the Dutch labour market (Van Ours and Ridder 1992; Van Ours 1989) .
However, before the selection procedure can begin potential applicants have to be located and encouraged to apply. To this end, employers use recruitment channels to spread information to the eligible potential candidates about the characteristics of vacant positions. In this context, Van Ours and Ridder (1993) ®nd that the use of advertisements increases the rate of arrival of applicants (which is nevertheless assumed to be constant throughout the application period).
The way in which employers choose recruitment channels has far-reaching theoretical implications in the relationship between labour markets and inequality. The choice of recruitment channel determines how job-related information will be distributed (the visibility of job-related information), which may in turn contribute to generate inequality (gender and race wage di¨eren-tial and segregation).
Firms can choose multiple recruitment channels to guarantee higher visibility of their vacancy/s among di¨erent strata of the population. Widespread search enable employers to gather a larger and more diversi®ed pool of applicants and could thus ensure higher gains from search (Kirnan et al. 1989) . Holzer (1996) investigates employer recruitment behaviour in the U.S. labour market, and in particular the relationship between type of skills sought and the recruitment channel used. The author ®nds that approximately one third of the ®rms in his analysis hired the most recently hired workers through newspaper advertisements. Advertisements are more likely to be used to hire workers in professional or managerial and clerical jobs.
Recruitment method use a¨ects vacancy durations as well. Roper (1988) analyses vacancy duration in the British labour market conditional on the ®rm recruitment strategy. The author ®nds that the use of multiple recruitment methods leads to shorter vacancy durations, the use of advertisements increases vacancy durations, whereas the use of informal recruitment methods tends to shorten it1 (see also Gorter et al. 1996; Russo et al. 1995) .
The number of applicants screened, the type of applicants hired, and the vacancy duration all depend on how employers search for candidates. The way employers search for potential candidates is contingent upon the general economic conditions prevailing on the labour market at the time of search. Burdett and Cunningham (1998) conclude similarly.
Herein, we set out to investigate employer search activities at the extensive margin and analyse how the search is in¯uenced by the labour market conditions that ®rms encounter during the recruitment process. To this end, we explore the interaction between the choice of the recruitment channels and the number of applicants generated. We also isolate recruitment channel speci®c e¨ects on the rate of arrival of applicants. The analysis is novel in that we exploit the heretofore generally neglected time dimension in our data in order to investigate the impact of changes in labour market conditions on employer recruitment behaviour.
Our results indicate that the economic conditions prevailing on the labour market do indeed in¯uence employer search activity at the extensive margin. In particular, we have seen that, in tight (slack) labour markets characterised by excess demand (supply) of labour, the¯ow of applicants is smaller (larger). Employers react to the shortage (excess) of applicants by making more (less) often use of advertisements; the recruitment channel that seems to generate the highest in¯ow of applicants.
The structure of the paper is as follows: we presents the relationship between recruitment channels use, applicants' arrival rate and vacancy duration in section 2. Section 3 describes our data set, and section 4 presents the empirical analysis. We conclude in section 5.
Recruitment channels, applicant arrival, and vacancy duration
Quits, lay-o¨s, and¯uctuations in product demand are all events which imply that ®rms must often readjust their employment levels. Since the recruitment of new employees is a time consuming activity, ®rms may experience job vacancies during their adjustment process. Due to the uncertainty intrinsic to the recruitment process job vacancies arise, because applicants are di½cult to locate and their productivity is not easily assessed (as outlined in Lippman and McCall 1976) .
Firms can search for new employees in a variety of ways by choosing one or more recruitment channels, but they will select the combination which is most e½cient. Rees (1966) classi®es recruitment channels into two broad categories: formal and informal. Formal recruitment channels include: advertisements, public and private employment agencies, school recruitment (milkrounds). Informal recruitment channels are open applications, the use of friends and relatives, and employee referrals. Informal search channels use social networks to spread job-related information.
Firms maximize pro®ts on a per-period basis by choosing the optimal search strategy, which is comprised of an optimal reservation level of productivity and choice of the recruitment channel(s).
The selection of recruitment channel results from the comparison of expected costs and expected bene®ts (Marsden and Campbell 1990; Holzer 1996) . The expected bene®ts deriving from the use of recruitment channels hinges on the fact that recruitment channels reach di¨erent types of candidates (types of applicants di¨er in their productivity distribution); on the fact that recruitment channels generate di¨erent¯ows of applicants (generally the larger the¯ow the higher the probability of ®nding a good candidate), and on the fact that di¨erent recruitment channels provide potential candidates with di¨erent job-related information (applicants use this information to form their job expectations, job expectations may di¨er in degree of reliability, according to which recruitment channel has conveyed the relevant information).
Advertisements are expensive due to direct advertisement costs as well as indirect extensive screening costs. However, advertisements can attract many applicants and are often very e¨ective in matching employed job seekers (Russo et al. 1997) .
Conversely, the use of the public employment o½ce as a recruitment channel is often costless (e.g. in the Netherlands), but personnel managers often complain that applicants are of poor quality and they lack motivation (Van Ours 1994). Barron and Mellow (1982) argue that the public employment service is not popular with employers because the applicants generated by this recruitment method are less likely to accept a job o¨er, and so the screening costs per vacancy rise.
Informal recruitment channels are considered to be highly e¨ective (Lindeboom et al. 1994) . The e¨ectiveness stems from the fact that employers and employees exchange important and reliable information about each other (Simon and Warner 1992) . Friends and relatives provide accurate information regarding working conditions and job demand (Montgomery 1991) . This enables the prospective employee to form reliable expectations about the new job which are less likely to be disproved once hired (Granovetter 1995) . The provision of reliable information reduces turnover and increases the value of the match. Incumbent workers also are likely to refer people of the same type and this tendency eases the screening procedure (productivity assessment, see Leicht and Marx 1997) . Williams et al. (1993) ®nd that formal and informal recruitment channels reach variously quali®ed applicants in terms of experience and education. In a similar manner, informal recruitment channels produce higher levels of prehire knowledge. However, even if the informal channel is virtually costless, personnel managers sometimes complain about the low number of applicants it generates (Mencken and Win®eld 1998) .
Screening applicants induces costs; to avoid unnecessary screening, employers would prefer to elicit applications from only the most suitable candidates (Windolf 1986). As a consequence, recruitment channels thought to reach only low productivity candidates may remain unused although the cost of such channels is virtually null.
We see from our aforementioned synopsis that employee search involves costs and therefore lowers the present value of the stream of pro®t, but search is also a productive activity in that it increases the possibility of attracting applicants in the future. Firms may search across various recruitment channels, each of which can be characterised by applicant arrival rate, cost of use, separation probability, and applicant probability distribution (see Fallick 1992) .
The optimal search strategy remains the same unless ®rms experience a change in the labour market conditions. Even if the optimal search strategy fails to provide a suitable candidate within a given period, the same search strategy will be enacted once again (provided that the labour market con-ditions have not changed) in the subsequent period. Osberg (1993) argues that the job search methods used by job seekers vary in their e¨ectiveness as conditions change on the labour market. In the same vein, if conditions on the labour market change, the employer search strategy should change as well. For example, an excess supply of labour is generally associated with an increase in the applicant arrival rate. In addition, job seekers compete with each other for scarce jobs; this process drives down their reservation wage, and recruitment becomes easier.
However another tendency needs to be considered. Excess demand of labour usually in¯uences the applicant productivity distribution (on-the-job search is procyclical, see Tobin 1972; Burgess 1993) . The low applicant arrival rate induces ®rms to compete against each other for scarce workers so job seekers consequently receive more job o¨ers. Greater numbers of job o¨ers rises their reservation wage, recruitment becomes di½cult and vacancy durations lengthen.
Employer optimal search strategies should change accordingly. Ceteris paribus, when the¯ow of applicants is low, employers switch to recruitment channels characterised by a relatively large applicant arrival rate, even if these recruitment channels are fairly expensive. Conversely, when the applicant arrival rate is high, every recruitment channel tends to generate a su½cient number of applicants; in these situations employers may opt for less expensive recruitment channels2.
In a reduced form model, the probability of ®lling a vacancy can be broken down into two components, the probability of contact with an applicant and the probability that an applicant is acceptable (i.e., the probability that the applicant's productivity is higher than the reservation level of productivity). Firm recruitment channel use (RCU, recruitment channels used during recruitment), will a¨ect both the probability of a contact and the acceptance probability, and it consequently a¨ects the completed vacancy duration T. The realised vacancy duration also depends on the total number of applicants that have been considered during the recruitment process.
In turn, the total vacancy duration does in¯uence the total number of applicants arrived, (denoted by TA). Hence we have: T TTA; RCU TA TAT; RCU 1 Equation (1) clearly shows the mutual dependence between the total number of applicants TA and the completed vacancy duration T3. Next, we model the number of applicants and the vacancy duration as joint processes.
2 Marsden and Campbell (1990) emphasises that recruitment channel productivity depends on job seeker search channel use. This line of reasoning requires a two-sided modelling that is beyond the scope of this paper. 3 Note that the total number of applicants (TA) can be written as follows:
RATEAPPs ds
where RATEAPP is the per-period applicant arrival rate, and T is the realised vacancy duration.
Recruitment channel use and applicant arrival
The data set
The empirical analysis is based on the survey``How do ®rms recruit?'' conducted among approximately 20,000 Dutch ®rms on behalf of the Dutch Ministry of Social A¨airs.
A randomly selected sample of ®rms is interviewed by telephone every two months (the sample therefore does not have a panel structure). We used data for the year 1991±1994 which include detailed information on 19,806 ®rms (47,404 ®lled vacancies).
In the survey employers were asked about speci®c aspects of recruitment, such as which recruitment channels are used, how many job applications are received, what is the vacancy duration, what are the vacancy and ®rm-speci®c characteristics (sector, number of employees). The data set does not contain information on wages, recruitment costs or timing in both the arrival of applicants and the activation of additional recruitment channels. Recruitment channels are classi®ed into the following ten categories: internal recruitment (among incumbent personnel), employee referral (via incumbent personnel), friends and relatives (of the recruiter; external acquaintances), open applications, advertisements, temporary work agencies, public employment o½ce, school recruitment, private employment agencies (headhunters), and a residual method``others'', which includes recruitment from training and internship programs.
The data refer to four years; 1991 and 1992 are years of a tight labour market, while 1993 and 1994 are years of a slack labour market. We used the ratio of total vacancies to total employment as a measure of labour demand condition on regional labour markets (the 12 administrative provinces in the Netherlands). The regional unemployment rate served as a measure of labour supply conditions. Additional information on the data can be found in Appendix A, where one can see that the average vacancy duration is approximately ®ve weeks (Barron et al. 1997 ®nd a similar duration for vacancies in the U.S.).
Some descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 to give an idea of the order of magnitude of the relationship among selected variables. Before proceeding any further, the following remarks are in order: (i) the average number of vacancies posted is higher when more recruitment channels are opened; (ii) the average duration of the recruitment procedure appears to be longer when more recruitment channels are used; (iii) advertisements provide a remarkably larger¯ow of applicants compared to the remaining recruitment channels; (iv) the pools of applicants are often quite small, the median number of applicants is seldom larger than four; and (v) informal recruitment methods appear to generate fewer applicants and to lead to a shorter vacancy duration.
The average number of recruitment channels used is quite low, 1.264; 15,221 ®rms used only one recruitment channel (77% of the sample) and have ®lled 32,207 vacancies. On the contrary, only 4,585 (23%) ®rms used more than one recruitment channel; these ®rms ®lled 13,474 vacancies.
There is no indication of a systematic relationship between the duration of the recruitment procedure and the number of vacancies posted (correlation coe½cient r À0:01, not signi®cant at 5%). There appears moreover to be a positive relationship between the number of applicants and the number of vacancies posted (correlation coe½cient r 0:29, signi®cant at 5%). The number of recruitment methods used positively correlates both with the number of vacancies posted (r 0:13, signi®cant at 5%) and with the vacancy duration (r 0:11, signi®cant at 5%).
Labour market conditions also appear to a¨ect the recruitment process, albeit weakly. We ®nd that the (regional) unemployment rate negatively correlates with the number of vacancies posted, the number of recruitment channels activated, and the vacancy duration (correlation coe½cients r À0:03, r À0:03, r À0:06, respectively; all signi®cant at 5%). On the other hand, the number of vacancies posted, the number of recruitment channels used, and the vacancy duration correlate positively with the vacancy rate (correlation coe½cients r 0:06, r 0:06, r 0:06, respectively; all of them signi®cant at 5%).
Insofar as employer search at the extensive margin is concerned, we ®nd that the number of applicants positively correlates with the number of di¨er-ent recruitment channels activated and negatively correlates with the vacancy rate (r 0:06, r À0:02, respectively; both are signi®cant at 5%).
We reach the conclusion that the number of recruitment channels used tends to a¨ect vacancy duration and the number of applicants in the same direction5.
The empirical analysis: recruitment channel use and applicant arrival rate
Firms' search activities during the recruitment process ®rst result into a number of applicants for the vacant position(s) TA. Next, to account for the fact that the number of applicants and the vacancy duration result from related processes, the two processes are modelled jointly. The bivariate reduced form model then assumes the following form:
where LNTA is the logarithm of the number of applicants LNTA lnTA, LNT is the logarithm of the vacancy duration LNT lnT6, p 1 and p 2 are the reduced form parameters to be estimated, X is the set of regressors used to control for observed heterogeneity. From the discussion in the previous three sections, it follows that typical candidates for X are the educational (and ex- 5 Barron et al. (1985) argue that as the extensive margin of search increases, the intensive margin decreases. The substitution can be accomplished by switching from an intensive informationoriented recruitment channel (such as the informal channel; see Montgomery 1991) to a quantityoriented recruitment channel (as advertisements seem to be). 6 The data represent a¯ow sample of ®lled vacancies with no censoring. In this case OLS gives unbiased but ine½cient parameter estimates (Lancaster 1991) . The results obtained here are comparable with an earlier duration analysis performed on the same data in Russo et al. (1995) . perience) requirements and the regional unemployment and vacancy rates. Furthermore, the existing empirical literature on vacancy duration and ®rms' search behaviour suggests that additional candidates could be: the number of workers sought, the type of job (permanent/temporary), the number of working hours involved (full-time/part-time), and the size of the ®rm. Industry di¨erences are captured by dummies. Cyclical and seasonal di¨erences are controlled for by using yearly and bimonthly dummies. The error terms ± e 1 and e 2 ± are jointly distributed according to a bivariate normal distribution. Common assumptions are: Ee 1 Ee 2 0, Vare 1 s 1 , and Vare 2 s 2 , whereas the covariance between e 1 and e 2 is allowed to be non-zero. Given the joint distribution of the error terms in the two equations, we can estimate the model by means of maximum likelihood7. The results are presented in Table 2 .
We have estimated two versions of each regression; the ®rst is a benchmark model (without the e¨ect of recruitment channel use, RCU ); the second includes the recruitment channels among the regressors (as in Roper 1988; Simon and Warner 1992; and Holzer 1996) . The comparison between the parameter estimates in Model I and Model II shows that a substantial part of the e¨ect of the independent variables is mediated by the activation of recruitment channels. This result parallels nicely with the results of other empirical analyses on recruitment channel choice, i.e. Russo et al. (1995) and Gorter et al. (1996) . After controlling for the recruitment channel use, the coe½cient referring to the vacancy rate turns negative and signi®cant. In other words, in a tight labour market the number of applicants decreases. The strong interaction between recruitment channels activation and labour demand conditions implies that employers do change their search strategies in response to di¨er-ent labour market conditions so that, on average, the number of arrived job seekers does not change over the business cycle. This is achieved by switching to advertisements which provide a much larger¯ow of applicants during periods of excess demand for labour.
However, an excess of labour supply (high unemployment) is not associated with a large number of applicants but instead tends to reduce the vacancy duration. This is consistent with the notion that high unemployment tends to reduce job seekers' reservation wages.
Vacancies requiring high educational standards also appear to attract a larger number of applicants, but the vacancy durations lengthen as well.
Sectoral patterns also appeared; all industries (except transport) tend to receive signi®cantly fewer applicants compared to the business service industry which could be indicative of a supply-side phenomenon. The diminishing percentage of employment in the industrial sector (including manufacturing, agriculture, mining, and energy industries) may have induced job seekers to look for employment opportunities in the business service industry (which is, in fact, growing). A supply-side e¨ect (the increased labour force participation of women) is also likely to account for the positive coe½cient of the yearly dummies in the regression regarding the number of applicants.
The positive e¨ect of the number of posted vacancies on the applicant arrival rate may be due to the higher success probability perceived by job seekers. But 16% of the e¨ect found in the benchmark model is spurious since it is due to the correlation between the number of vacant positions posted and the choice of recruitment channel/s. The elasticity of the number of applicants with respect to the number of posted vacancies is 0.656. A 10% increase in the number of posted vacancies generates, on average, a 6.56% increase in the number of applicants. In addition, the elasticity of the vacancy duration to the number of posted vacancies is not signi®cantly di¨erent from zero. That is, an increase in the number of posted vacancies does not signi®cantly change the length of the recruitment procedure. It thus appears, that the pooling of vacancies leads to e½ciency gains in recruitment; the positive e¨ect on duration found in the benchmark model is entirely due to di¨erences in recruitment methods.
The positive sign of the coe½cient regarding the ®rm size on the number of applicants may originate from the higher wages paid by large ®rms (the likelihood of ®nding better quali®ed applicants of higher quality is also higher; see and Oi 1993) . Firms with more employees can exploit a larger social network and can therefore use the informal channels more e¨ectively (see, for example Montgomery 1991) .
The introduction of the recruitment channels has a larger impact on the parameter estimates of the number of applicants sub-model than on those of the vacancy duration sub-model. For example, the introduction of the recruitment channels reduces the size of the parameters referring to educational requirements in the benchmark model referring to the number of applicants (vacancy duration) as follows: secondary vocational about 28% (9.6%), secondary general 13.4% (4%), and university high vocational 27.2% (13.8%). The magnitude of the impact of the inclusion of the recruitment channels used on the parameters of the number of applicants sub-model is clearly larger than the impact on the parameters of the vacancy duration sub-model. Furthermore, the use of informal recruitment channels generates a smaller number of applicants than formal recruitment channels do whereas informal channels seem to have a smaller impact on the vacancy duration than formal channels.
Conversely, the temporary placement agency appears to be a very e½cient recruitment channel, because it generates fewer applicants and is associated with shorter vacancy durations.
Vacancy duration and applicant arrivals are positively correlated processes8.
Next, in order to assess the impact of the use of multiple recruitment channels, we follow the approach of Roper (1988) and break down the estimated error components from Models I and II according to the ®rst recruitment channel activated and to the total number of recruitment channels used. The results are shown in Table 3 .
8 To account for di¨erences in the length of the recruitment process, one could weight the dependent variable (the number of applicants) by the vacancy duration; the time dimension would be re-scaled and one would implicitly assume a constant daily rate of arrival of applicants TA=T. The e¨ect of the exogenous variables on the thus constructed applicant arrival rate can be obtained by subtracting the value of the parameters obtained from the vacancy duration regression from the estimate obtained from the number of applicants regression. The results are presented in Table B1 in Appendix B and are nicely in line with the estimates in Van Ours and Ridder (1993). In contrast to the ®ndings in Roper (1988) for the U.K. labour market, we discover that the use of more recruitment channels is generally associated with a longer vacancy duration and to larger¯ows of applicants. This suggests that employers in tight labour markets use multiple recruitment channels to compensate for the lack of candidates. The exception regards the use of advertisements; placing advertisements jointly with the activation of auxiliary recruitment channels tends to result in a lower number of applicants and in a longer vacancy duration. This could be associated with the presence of recruitment di½culties (see Van Ommeren and Russo 1997) .
Because our focus is on ®rms' search practices at the extensive margin, and since the use of advertisements seems to generate a substantially higher number of applicants9, we want to isolate advertisement-speci®c e¨ects on the number of applicants.
We have therefore adopted a switching regression model, estimated in the same way suggested in Maddala (1983) 10. We distinguish between two regimes advrt; o, the ®rst of which characterises the use of advertisements as the recruitment channel (denoted by advrt); the second (denoted by o) characterises the use of any of the remaining recruitment channels. The criterion function I i determines which of the states is applicable. The model reads as follows:
where LNTA is the logarithm of the number of applicants, b and a are the parameters to be estimated, X is the set of regressors, u and z are the error terms (correlated). So if I Ã > 0 (or equivalently aX > Àz), the ®rm considered activates advertisements (Advertisements 1). If z is distributed according to a normal distribution, it is easy to recognise in the third line of equation (3) a probit model, and consequently Varz is ®xed at 1. The estimation procedure adopted here is the two-step procedure (see Maddala 1983, pp. 223±228) . In the ®rst step we obtain the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the probit model â, and then we calculate the Mills ratio W 1 fâX = FâX , and Wo fâX =1 À FâX (f is the Normal density function, and F is the corresponding cumulative distribution function).
In the second step we estimate the following model:
and hence obtain estimates of b advrt ; b o , l's (l indicates the correlation between the error components in the two regimes ± u advrt and u o ± and z)11. The estimates of the switching regression model are presented in Table 4 . The estimates of the probit model indicate that advertisements are more likely to be used when greater numbers of vacancies have to be ®lled, during periods of a tight labour market, for positions requiring high educational standards and working experience, and when permanent positions must be ®lled. On the contrary, advertisements are less likely to be used during periods of a slack labour market (thus supporting the argument in Marsden and Campbell 1990).
The estimates of the coe½cients of the Mills ratios l in the two regimes give additional insights into the employer search at the extensive margin (Green 1993) .
The coe½cients of the Mills ratios in the two regimes are both positive, but the coe½cient of the selectivity correction in regime 1 (Advertisements 1) is only weakly signi®cant (at 10%). The sign of the coe½cients of the selectivity correction give rise to the following interpretations: employers who use advertisements are better than average at searching at the extensive margin in either regime, but they are relatively better at searching at the extensive margin via advertisements (since they want more applicants). Employers choosing the alternative regime are less good than average at searching at the extensive margin, but they are relatively better at searching via the alternative regime than via advertisements (as they prefer having fewer applicants).
To quantify the importance of the selectivity correction terms, we have also evaluated the switching regression model at the sample average. The results are presented in Table 5 .
It can be seen that the selectivity correction accounts for an increase of about 165% of the in¯ow of applicants in regime 1 (advertisements) and for a drop of about 29% of the in¯ow of applicants in regime 2 (any of the remaining recruitment channels). However, one should be careful in interpreting these results as pure selectivity e¨ects (Lee 1996, and Footnote 8) . On average, because of their deliberate choice of advertisements, employers receive nine more applicants. Conversely, employers who deliberately choose for any of the remaining recruitment channels receive, on average, about one less applicant.
Conclusions
In this paper we have empirically explored employer search activities at the extensive margin. To this end we have used unique micro data on the recruitment behaviour of Dutch ®rms. The data have a time dimension which enables 11 The error terms v in equation (4) are heteroscedastic, in addition, W1 and Wo are predicted values. Hence, the standard errors obtained from applying OLS are incorrect. To overcome this problem we should have implemented the correction procedure (for the standard errors) proposed in Maddala (1983) . The procedure itself appeared to be over-demanding in terms of computational time for the full data set; thus we have implemented it for 1000, 2000, and 3000 randomly selected observations. The discrepancies between the standard errors obtained from OLS and the correct ones were negligible (in the third decimal digits). We therefore report here the OLS standard errors. us to investigate the e¨ect of changing labour market conditions on employer recruitment strategies. Our empirical analyses show that ®rms that pool similar vacancies appear to enjoy e½ciency gains in recruitment, and that the use of multiple recruitment channels is associated with a higher number of applicants and with longer vacancy durations. The only exception occurs when employers begin the recruitment process by using advertisements. In this case the use of multiple recruitment channels is associated with fewer applicants but still with longer vacancy durations. More speci®cally, the ceteris paribus e¨ect of the use of advertisements leads to about nine additional applicants. A switching regression model produces an almost identical estimate. The e¨ect of the use of advertisements on the number of applicants is therefore quite robust.
Furthermore, employers tend to adopt di¨erent recruitment strategies during slack and tight labour markets, in so doing they are able to counterbalance cyclical variations in the applicant arrival rate. During periods of excess demand when job seekers become scarce, employers are more likely to prefer advertisements, because this recruitment channel generates a substantially higher applicant arrival rate. On the contrary, during slack labour markets where the applicant arrival rate is larger, employers tend to use recruitment channels other than advertisements. Without accounting for the e¨ect of the change in employer search behaviour over the cycle, the number of applicants appears to be stable over time, even when prevailing economic conditions change. Our results reveal that the use of recruitment channels and the applicant arrival rate are positively correlated processes and that employer search activities at the extensive margin are heavily in¯uenced by the economic conditions prevailing on the labour market in which ®rms are operating. The reference group of the variables are given in parenthesis: Years (1991), Months (January± February), Industry (Business Services), Education (Primary), Full-Time (Part-Time), Permanent (Temporary), Experience (No Experience), Age Limits (no Age Limits), Size (Small).
